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Abstract 
 
 
Often it is difficult to understand the level of security inherent in payment card 
transactions because the amount of information available about the various 
involved standards and technologies is vast. These technologies and 
standards were designed, developed and issued by different organizations to 
protect data used in card payment transactions to counteract the increasing 
threat that criminals represent with their constant attacks. This thesis 
assembles a compendium of the technologies and standards used by parties 
involved in card payments, keeping the focus on the merchant side. The work 
also creates metrics and uses them to evaluate these technologies and 
standards. Building on technical documents and standards, the thesis 
addresses these quesitons: To what extent do these involved technologies 
provide security for the data used in card payment transactions for the different 
payment channels? How much effort is required of merchants using self-
assessment questionnaires (SAQs) to ensure their compliance with the 
payment card industry data security standard (PCI DSS)? In this context, SAQs 
are tools used to determine compliance with PCI DSS.  
 
To achieve these goals it was required to first gather and organize information 
from the many organizations, elements, processes, technologies and 
standards involved in the card payment transaction. The separate  
technologies and SAQs identified were then assigned to their respective 
payment channels. Quantifiable metrics were developed and then applied to 
evaluating the features of individual technologies and SAQs. The evaluation 
results demonstrated that some technologies provide little to no added value to 
the security of card payments. The results also indicated that the level of effort 
required of a merchant to comply with PCI DSS is greater when using certaing 
SAQs. Based on these results, it is recommended to stop supporting magnetic 
stripes and card verification value version 2 technologies and to replace them 
with the EMV chip and the three domain secure version 2.0 authentication 
protocol, respectively. Also, merchants should aim to be eligible for SAQ A and 
SAQ P2PE versions when seeking to comply with PCI DSS in the different 
payment channels. Further study is required in the innovation and creation of 
technologies and rules to strengthen card payments against the constant 
evolution of criminal activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Even to day, obsolete and out-of-date technologies are still used in payment 
card transactions. To address this situation, it is important to analyze and 
evaluate of security developments in electronic payment methods to understand 
how the security of the data used in payment transactions has been improved 
with advent of newer technologies. 
 
First of all, it is important to provide a brief introduction of the payment card 
industry, starting with the concept of payment cards. Payment cards are plastic 
or metal cards that allow the cardholder to make payments at a merchant’s 
premises. This form of payment is known as electronic payment, and such 
cards are now widely used around the globe and compete with cash-based 
payments. Due to their broad, global acceptance, criminals have been 
continually attacking card-based payments. 
 
These attacks, if successful, affect the various entities involved in card 
payments including, for example, the cardholder, the merchant and the issuer 
bank. For the cardholder, the criminal using the sensitive account data 
gathered, as a result of an attack, can perform a type of fraud called identity 
theft, which repercussions for the cardholder are, for example, the reduction of 
the total account balance to zero, a great amount of debt and an affected credit 
score. For the merchant, the criminal buying a good or service using stolen 
payment card information leads to chargeback initiated by the cardholder, which 
is the reposition of money to the cardholder leaving the merchant with the loss 
of the good or service sold to the fraudster. For the issuer bank, the criminal can 
withdraw money from an automated teller machine using a stolen or cloned 
payment card, which leads to the bank reimbursing the amount of money 
withdrawn to the cardholder. As a consequence, organizations and individuals 
involved in the payment card industry have suffered substantial losses. To 
counteract fraud, two important organizations were created by the major brands 
in the payment card industry to set standards and technical specifications. 
These organizations are the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council 
and the Europay Mastercard Visa Consortium. These standards and 
technologies play a crucial role because they provide security and security rules 
for all participants in the payment transaction process. 
 
Currently there are many sources of information, technical documents and 
standards that explain the different elements, procedures and requirements to 
secure the data used in card payment transactions. Because, this data comes 
from so many sources, it can be challenging to understand how the 
technologies and standards involved in the payment card industry provide 
security during the card payment transaction life cycle. It can be also 
challenging to find quantifiable metrics to evaluate the various technologies and 
tools that a merchant can use to comply with the payment card industry data 
security standard. 
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After gaining a picture of the current payment landscape, it is important to 
understand the different roles that each organization involved in this industry 
has to play to assure the security of transactions. These institutions define 
concepts, standards and technologies that, when used together, undoubtedly 
affect the security of the overall process. These organizations can also 
collaborate to develop new technologies and standards as the need arises in 
the market. 
 
Another critical point is to understand the payment cards’ structure. This is 
essential because it brings clarity on the number of elements that the payment 
card possesses, along with the objectives that these elements fulfill. While not 
all of these elements have a positive impact on the overall card payment 
transaction life cycle, those elements whose impact is negative are still present, 
and it is imperative to understand the reasons behind this. 
 
To further understand the card payment transaction process, it is essential to 
comprehend its life cycle and the different institutions involved. Knowing the 
participants and their duties helps provide more detailed insight into the 
process. Additionally, a better comprehension of the channels used for card 
payments and their processes brings a clearer understanding of the card 
payment flow. 
 
As mentioned above, there are different technologies and standards commonly 
used for card payments. It is important to understand the technologies involved 
in the payment process and the procedures, security mechanisms, and 
requirements these technologies use to secure payment channels. The 
standards present an additional security measure apart from the technologies 
used. It is critical to learn from whom the various types of standards require 
compliance, the objectives of these standards, and the different tools used to 
comply with them. In this way, the scope and responsibilities of the different 
institutions in providing security in the card payment transaction become 
clearer. 
 
Finally, after gathering and analyzing all the previous information, it is essential 
to evaluate the involved technologies in the payment process and the involved 
self-assessment questionnaires used for the compliance of the payment card 
industry data security standard. This evaluation provides an understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the card payment security, and answers to 
two specify questions. The first question being, To what extend do these 
involved technologies provide security for the data used in card payment 
transactions for the different payment channels?. And the second question 
being, How much effort is required of merchants using self-assessment 
questionnaires to ensure their compliance with the payment card industry data 
security standard? Different metrics will be defined to objectively evaluate the 
security of card payments. The evaluation results will be the basis for the 
recommendations to the involved parties. 
 
To address the above objectives, this thesis has been divided into five chapters: 
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• Chapter 1 addresses the various organizations that directly or indirectly 
play a role in the card payment transaction procedures. 
• Chapter 2 focuses on the different elements that comprise a payment 
card and explains the security mechanisms they provide. 
• Chapter 3 explains the overall life cycle of the card payment transactions 
along with the payment channels used. 
• Chapter 4 describes the technologies and standards used by the 
payment card industry to secure the data used in card payments. 
• Chapter 5 defines metrics used to evaluate the technologies and 
standard compliance tools. These metrics are designed to assess the 
features the technologies offer and the amount of effort required of a 
merchant using the various payment card industry data security standard 
compliance tools. 
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CHAPTER 1. ORGANIZATIONS 
 
This chapter explains the involvement and contribution of the different 
organizations involved in the card payment transaction process. 
 
In the late 1990s each financial service organization had its own procedures for 
providing security to transactions carried out with payment card [1]. The 
absence of a common standard for security procedures for card payment 
transactions resulted in the growth of fraud losses between the late 1990s and 
early 2000s [1], which resulted in the creation of the first standards organization 
in 2006 [2]. 
 
In 1999 American Express, Discover, Japan Credit Bureau, MasterCard, 
UnionPay and Visa formed the Europay Mastercard Visa Consortium (EMVCo), 
which is an organization in charge of technical specifications for card pyment 
transactions [3]. Later in 2006 American Express, Discover, Japan Credit 
Bureau, MasterCard and Visa formed the Payment Card Industry Security 
Standards Council (PCI SSC), which is an organization in charge of issuing 
standards for card payment transactions [4]. Both of these organizations play an 
important role in the security of card payments (see Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 EMVCo and PCI SSC 
 
1.1 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
 
Before mentioning the organizations in charge of electronic payments, it is 
essential to recognize the International Organization for Standardization. 
 
ISO defines various sets of standards; two are of particular interest: ISO 24760 
for information technology security and privacy [5], and ISO 27000 for 
information security management systems [6]. These standards define the 
following concepts that are important for the understanding of this document. 
 
• Identification: Process of recognizing an entity in a particular domain as 
distinct from other individuals. 
• Authentication: Provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an 
individual is correct. 
• Authorization: Process of granting privileges with an understood level of 
confidence established by a claimed identity. 
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The requirements and procedures for the technologies and standards studied in 
this thesis, are developed around the above mentioned core concepts. 
 
1.2 Europay Mastercard Visa Consortium (EMVCo) 
 
EMVCo is a professional body that incorporates globally accepted standards to 
promote the development of an infrastructure to obtain a consistent, 
interoperable, and secure payment process. Also, EMVCo communicates with  
Near Field Communication Forum, GlobalPlatform, Global Systems for Mobile 
Communications Association, PCI SSC, French Association for Contactless 
Mobile Services, Asia Pacific Smart Card Association, Advance Card 
Technology Canada, European Telecommunications Standards Institute, the 
European Payment Council, Fast Identity Online Alliance, Secure Technology 
Alliance, the United States Payments Forum, and the World Wide Web 
Consortium to receive and share perspectives on areas of mutual interest [7]. 
 
EMVCo has categorized countries by regions to obtain Europay Mastercard 
Visa (EMV) chips deployment and adoption statistics. These statistics can be 
seen in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 Global deployment and adoption of EMV chip card [8] 
 2016 2017 2018 
Region 
EMV 
Cards 
Adoption 
Rate 
EMV 
Cards 
Adoption 
Rate 
EMV 
Cards 
Adoption 
Rate 
Africa & 
the Middle 
East 
184M 68.7% 219M 74.8% 272M 87.8% 
Asia 
Pacific 
3,331M 38.8% 4,147M 45.7% 5,001M 51.1% 
Canada, 
Latin 
America, 
and the 
Caribbean 
717M 75.7% 820M 85.7% 848M 86.9% 
Europe 
Zone 1 
921M 84.9% 939M 84.4% 966M 85.5% 
Europe 
Zone 2 
243M 63.7% 276M 71.4% 301M 80.4% 
United 
States 
675M 52.2% 785M 58.5% 842M 60.7% 
 
EMVCo’s specifications are shown as follows [7]: 
 
• Contact EMV Specification 
• Contactless EMV Specification 
• Mobile EMV Specification 
• EMV Payment Tokenization Specification 
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• EMV QR Code Specification 
• EMV Secure Remote Commerce Specifications 
• EMV 2nd Generation Specification 
• EMV Three Domain Secure (3DS) Specification 
 
The EMV chip is introduced in section 2.2, and a more detailed view of the EMV 
chip along with other EMV specifications is given in section 4.1. The information 
within these sections provides a better understanding of the payment 
transaction procedure. 
 
1.3 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council 
(PCI SSC) 
 
PCI SSC is a global forum that leads a global effort between entities that stores, 
processes, or transmits sensitive cardholder data, to assure data security. 
 
To correctly implement PCI SSC standards, the Council provides tools such as 
assessment and scanning qualifications, training and education, product 
certification programs and self-assessment questionnaires (SAQs) [9]. To learn 
more about SAQs refer to section 4.2.1.3. 
 
PCI SSC defines the following set of standards [10]: 
 
• Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) 
• PCI Secure Software Standard 
• PCI Secure Software Life Cycle Standard 
• PCI Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS) 
• PCI Point-to-Point Encryption Standard (P2PE) 
• PCI PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Hardware Security Module (HSM) 
Standard 
• PCI PTS Point of Interaction (POI) Standard 
• PCI Card Production and Provisioning Logical Security Standard 
• PCI Card Production and Provisioning Physical Security Standard 
• PCI 3DS Core Security Standard 
• PCI 3DS Software Development Kit (SDK) Standard 
• PCI Personal Identification Number (PIN) Security Standard 
• PCI Software-Based PIN Entry on Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
Security Standard 
• PCI Software-Based PIN Entry on COTS Test Standard 
• PCI Token Service Provicers (TSP) Security Standard 
 
See section 4.2 for a better understanding of the different PCI standards 
addressed in this document. 
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1.4 EMVCo and PCI SSC Interaction 
 
EMVCo and PCI SSC collaborate to increase data security and reduce fraud. 
To achieve these goals, EMVCo, with its EMV chip, maintains the cardholder's 
sensitive data in encrypted form, while PCI standards specify procedures to 
keep the data secure through the entire transaction process, as detailed in [11]. 
 
In 2017, EMVCo and PCI SSC started a direct collaboration to support the 
launch of 3DS version 2.0. EMVCo's role was to deliver the EMV 3DS 2.0 
specification, while PCI SSC's purpose was to provide security requirements, 
testing procedures, assessor training, and reporting templates to address the 
3DS 2.0 specification [12]. 
 
Refer to section 4.1.2 and section 4.2.5 for a more in-depth view of 3DS 2.0. 
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CHAPTER 2. PAYMENT CARD STRUCTURE 
 
This chapter’s objective is to explain the different elements that comprise a 
payment card. 
 
Payment cards have embedded in their plastic or metal various elements. Each 
of these elements plays a role in the payment transaction process and can be 
seen in Figure 2.1 [13]: 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Payment card structure 
 
1. Issuer bank’s name  
2. EMV chip 
3. Primary account number (PAN) 
4. Expiration date 
5. Cardholder’s name 
6. Card network logo 
7. Magnetic stripe (MS) 
8. Cardholder’s signature 
9. Card verification value (CVV) 
10. Security hologram 
 
2.1. Issuer Bank 
 
Issuer banks are financial institutions that offer payment cards, extend credit 
limits to qualified consumers [14] and provide financial back-up to merchants for 
transactions made with issued payment cards. 
 
For credit cards, the issuer bank assumes the ability of cardholders to pay their 
debt when using credit cards. For debit cards, the issuer bank uses the 
cardholder's balance to pay purchases made with debit cards. 
 
2.2. EMV Chip 
 
EMV Contact and Contactless specifications refer to the form of communication 
between the integrated circuit card (ICC) and the POI device performs. For 
EMV Contact, the ICC and the POI need to come into physical contact [15], 
while in EMV Contactless, the ICC and the POI use near field communication 
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(NFC) technology and are required to be within sufficient proximity [16] (see 
Figure 2.2). 
 
The EMV chip improves security in card-present (CP) scenarios with the 
following features that reduce fraud from counterfeit, loss, and stolen cards [17]: 
 
• Authentication of the chip card: Performed by the POI to distinguish 
genuine cards from fake or stolen cards. 
• Risk management parameters: The issuer defines the conditions under 
which to conduct offline or online transactions. 
• Transaction integrity: This is the result of digitally signing payment data. 
• Robust cardholder verification methods: These help to protect against 
fraud from lost and stolen cards. 
 
The chip uses various cryptographic functions to store the cardholder’s 
sensitive data [18]. 
 
  
Fig. 2.2 Contact and contactless communication between ICC and POI 
 
According to the EMVCo’s report from 2018, half of the payment cards issued 
worldwide are EMV-chip based payment cards [19]. 
 
Refer to section 4.1.1 for a more in-depth view of the EMV chip, and refer to 
section 3.2 and section 3.3 for an explanation of CP and card-not-present 
(CNP) channels. 
 
2.3. Primary Account Number (PAN) 
 
The PAN identifies the payment card and is used by an issuing bank to 
determine the origin or destination of a transaction. The PAN’s structure is as 
follows [20]: 
 
• The first six digits identify the card network. These digits are known as 
the issuer identification number (IIN) or the bank identification number, 
and contain as its first digit the major industry identifier. The MII identifies 
the industry that the payment card issuer belongs to. 
• The last digit is a check digit used to verify the correct transmission of the 
PAN during a card payment transaction. 
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• The digits between the IIN and the check digit identify the cardholder’s 
account. 
 
The Luhn algorithm is used to determine the check digit [21]. Figure 2.3 shows 
its procedure, followed by an explanation. 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Luhn algorithm process 
 
1. Number each digit from right to left. 
2. For even positions multiply by 2 and for odd positions multiply by 1. 
i. If the result of the multiplication is a two-digit number, add the 
digits together. 
3. Add all the results obtained from step 2 together. 
4. The check digit is difference between the result from step 3 and the 
nearest multiple of 10. 
 
The PAN is sensitive data stored within the payment card. To protect it, PCI 
DSS has defined a maximum number of digits that can be shown on a display 
so as not to compromise the cardholder. Refer to section 4.2.1.1. 
 
2.4. Expiration Date, Cardholder Name and Card Network 
 
The expiration date allows issuers to replace cards on a timely basis and 
update the technology of their EMV chips. It is also used to prevent fraud in the 
CNP payment channel because, without the expiration date, a PAN cannot be 
used [22]. 
 
The cardholder name is the person authorized by the issuer bank to use the 
payment card. Only authorized individuals can make use of the payment card, 
and on the CP payment channel, the merchant is required to ask for an 
identification document before starting the payment card transaction process 
[23] when using the MS of the payment card. 
 
The card network logo is used to identify the payment card’s network. These 
card networks serve as a backer for institutions such as acquirers and issuers 
with their respective customers. These institutions are recognizable brands that 
are in charge of ensuring that transactions are processed correctly, of setting 
guidelines and qualifications for their member institutions, and of serving as 
mediators of disputes between parties involved in the transaction process [24]. 
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2.5. Magnetic Stripe (MS) 
 
An MS contains the cardholder’s sensitive information stored in the magnetic 
fields of the band as cleartext. This band is a passive element that is still used 
to provide compatibility with out-of-date POI models, and is activated by swiping 
it through a POI [25]. See Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 MS card and reading device 
 
This band contains three tracks of information. The first and second track 
contain the cardholder's PAN and name, the card's expiration date and the 
country code, and the third track stores additional information. Each track also 
incorporates a longitudinal redundancy check (LRC) used for error control 
during the transmission of data from that track [26]. 
 
Malicious individuals can target and clone magnetic bands because they hold 
static information and are easy to manufacture and encode [27]. Cloning 
requires a third-party electronic device to scan the card before the insertion into 
a POI. Such a device records the stored information from an MS, then transfers 
the data to a new card or rewrites it to a stolen card [28]. 
 
The European Central Bank in its executive summary of 2018 cites a reduction 
of fraud from point-of-sale (POS) systems and automated teller machines 
(ATMs) due to the high adoption rate of EMV chips in POIs, the use of geo-
blocking, and the increase of security measures (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 European percentages of total fraud attributable to POS, CNP and 
ATM transactions [29] 
Fraud Statistics for different scenarios 
Fraud 
Scenarios 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
POS 23% 19% 19% 20% 19% 
CNP 60% 67% 69% 71% 73% 
ATM 17% 14% 12% 9% 8% 
 
Refer to section 5.1.1 for an analysis of other technologies compared to the 
EMV chip. 
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2.6. Cardholder Signature 
 
This feature is not currently being used by merchants. The idea behind it was to 
verify the signature of the payment card against the cardholder’s ID or driver’s 
license to corroborate the cardholder’s identity [30]. With the advent of more 
robust verification mechanisms, the cardholder’s signature has become an 
outdated security measure for payment cards [31]. As a result, cardholder 
signature is no longer required or used by American Express, Discover, 
Mastercard, or Visa since April of 2018 [32]. 
 
2.7. Card Verification Value (CVV) 
 
The CVV is a three-digit or four-digit security code used by the issuing bank to 
verify the payment card. The CVV has evolved and improved over time. Its first 
version, the CVV1, was encoded in the card’s MS. The second version, the 
CVV2, is used in CNP scenarios. To generate the CVV2, an issuer bank uses 
secret encryption keys to encrypt the PAN and expiry date [33]. 
 
As mentioned in section 1.4, EMVCo and PCI SSC worked together to bring out 
the 3DS 2.0 specification, which will replace CVV2 with a robust solution as 
seen in section 4.1.2 and section 4.2.5. An analysis in section 5.2.1 compares 
CVV2 with 3DS 2.0. 
 
2.8. Security Hologram 
 
Holograms on payment cards are another security mechanism that enables a 
more secure payment processing at a POS. The attendant at a POS checks the 
presence of the security hologram. If it is present, it confirms that the presented 
card is a valid payment card. If it is absent, it is an indication that the presented 
card might be a fake [34]. 
 
The main purpose for security holograms is to prevent forgery, or at least make 
it difficult. Holograms cannot be scanned or copied on a photocopier and have 
hidden images or text placed in them to provide immediate authentication and 
validation [35]. Security holograms many features including covert laser 
readable images, kinetic images, microtexts, nanotexts, concealed images, 
guilloche patterns (see Figure 2.5). 
 
• Covert Laser Readable Images: Generated by dot matrix printers, and 
verified by a laser. 
• Kinetic Images: A change in the angle of observation gives the illusion of 
movement. 
• Microtexts: Text embedded in holograms with sizes from 50 to 150 
micrometers. 
• Nanotexts: Text embedded in holograms, verified by the use of a 
microscope, and with a size of less than 50 micrometers. 
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• Concealed Images: Thin lines and contours appear when viewed from a 
specific angle. 
• Guilloche Patterns: A set of complicated geometric patterns that are 
drawn in high resolution and vary in color at each line. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 Security hologram example 
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CHAPTER 3. PAYMENT CHANNELS 
 
This chapter explains the different payment channels that are used in the 
payment transaction process. 
 
Payment channels are the forms in which a merchant accepts payments from a 
customer. There are two types of payment channels: CP and CNP. 
 
3.1. Payment Life Cycle 
 
To gain a fuller understanding of the topic covered in this thesis, it is essential to 
address the life cycle of a payment process and the involved entities (see 
Figure 3.1). 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Payment process life cycle 
 
The different entities involved are defined [36] below: 
 
• Cardholder: The cardholder is the person to whom the issuer bank issues 
the payment card; in other words, this is the owner of the payment card. 
• Merchant: A merchant is any entity that has accepted a payment card as 
a form of payment for its goods or services. 
• Payment Solution Provider (PSP): Also known as the payment network, 
the PSP is the entity in charge of connecting the merchant with various 
acquirer banks and card networks. 
• Issuer Bank: An issuer bank is a financial institution that issues payment 
cards and offers other services to its consumers (see section 2.1). 
• Acquirer Bank: An acquirer bank is a financial entity that in support of the 
merchant handles payments done with payment cards. 
 
It is essential to define the elements used to process payment transactions: 
 
• ICC: A plastic card with an embedded circuit used to control access to a 
resource or service [37]. 
• POI: Hardware component that permits purchases with payment cards 
[38]. 
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• POS: The location a customer initialize a card payment [39]. 
 
Another term used often in this document is the PIN, which is an identifying 
number assigned by the issuer to the cardholder and which is used to 
authenticate the cardholder before a transaction [40] in the CP channel. 
 
3.2. Card-Present (CP) 
 
A CP transaction occurs when the cardholder is physically present at the 
merchant’s facilities [41]. This type of payment channel uses the MS (see 
section 2.5) or the EMV chip (see section 2.2) technologies to start the payment 
process. In the CP channel, EMV uses different cardholder verification 
methods, mentioned in section 4.1.1.2. 
 
In Figure 3.2, an overall view of the CP channel is presented. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 Card-present channel 
 
3.3. Card-Not-Present (CNP) 
 
A CNP transaction occurs when the cardholder is not physically present at the 
merchant’s facilities [42]. A CNP transaction can be performed through the 
merchant’s application or website or by mail order and telephone order 
(MOTO). A scheme for this channel is presented in Figure 3.3. 
 
These types of payment channels are more susceptible to fraud due to the 
physical absence of the cardholder during the transaction [43] and the 
challenge to clearly authenticate the legitimate cardholder. To address these 
problems, as mentioned in section 1.4, EMVCo and PCI SSC delivered the 3DS 
2.0 specification. For more information, refer to section 4.1.2 and section 4.2.5. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Card-not-present channel 
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CHAPTER 4: INVOLVED STANDARDS 
 
This chapter provides a description of some specifications and standards 
involved in the card payment transaction. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, EMVCo and PCI SSC have defined various 
specifications and standards to secure the payment transaction process. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Standards’ scope in the transaction process 
 
4.1. EMV Specifications 
 
As mentioned in section 1.2, EMVCo specifications, seek to achieve 
interoperability by defining requirements and enabling secure payments. To this 
end, this section addresses the following EMV specifications: 
 
• Contact and contactless EMV specifications 
• EMV 3DS version 2.0 specification 
• EMV payment tokenization specification 
 
4.1.1. EMV Contact and Contactless Specification 
 
The main objective is to secure payment transactions in the CP channel 
initialized by contact or contactless interaction between the ICC and the POI. In 
the contactless specification, the payment brands define their procedure, while 
in the contact specification, EMV has defined the process shown in Figure 4.2. 
To learn more about the transaction procedure of the EMV contact 
specifications, refer to [44] and [45]. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 EMV contact transaction process 
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Additionally, the EMV chip introduces a message authentication code (MAC) so 
that issuer banks can verify the integrity and authenticity of the transmitted 
messages [46]. 
 
4.1.1.1. Authentication Methods 
 
The EMV chip performs data authentication [47], as seen in Figure 4.2, to 
ensure the authenticity of the payment card, which is achieved by one of the 
following means: 
 
• Static Data Authentication (SDA) 
• Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) 
• Combined Dynamic Data Authentication (CDA) 
 
4.1.1.1.1. Static Data Authentication 
 
SDA is independent of the actual transaction, making it susceptible to replay 
attacks [48], which occur when the transmitted data is maliciously delayed or 
retransmitted. The SDA procedure is shown in Figure 4.3, followed by an 
explanation. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3 Static data authentication procedure 
 
ICC Issuance: 
 
1. Issuer generates a key pair, then stores the private key in the ICC and 
sends the public key inside a certificate signing request (CSR) to a 
certification authority (CA). 
2. The CA signs and sends back the received CSR, producing a certificate 
for the issuer. The issuer then stores the certificate in the ICC. 
 
Payment Process: 
 
1. The ICC signs the stored static application data with the issuer's private 
key. This produces signed static application data (SSAD), which the ICC 
transmits along with the issuer certificate to the POI. 
2. The POI verifies the CA signature of the issuer certificate using the CA 
public key. 
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3. Finally, the POI verifies the received SSAD using the issuer's public key 
extracted from the issuer certificate. 
 
4.1.1.1.2. Dynamic Data Authentication 
 
Unlike SDA, DDA prevents replay attacks, although it is susceptible to man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attacks directed at the communication between the ICC and 
the POI [49]. Its procedure is shown in Figure 4.4, followed by an explanation. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Dynamic data authentication procedure 
 
ICC Issuance: 
 
1. Issuer generates a key pair, then stores the private key in the ICC and 
sends the public key inside a CSR to a CA. 
2. The CA signs and sends back the received CSR producing a certificate 
for the issuer. The issuer then stores the certificate in the ICC. 
3. Issuer generates a key pair for the ICC, then stores the private key in the 
ICC and produces a CSR with the public key. 
4. The issuer signs the CSR producing a certificate then stores the 
certificate in the ICC. 
 
Payment Process: 
 
1. The ICC generates an SSAD file. 
2. The ICC signs the dynamic application data (SDAD) using its private key. 
This dynamic application data is a random number generated by the 
terminal for each new EMV transaction. 
3. The ICC sends the issuer’s and ICC’s certificates, the SSAD and the 
SDAD during the communication with the POI. 
4. The POI verifies the issuer’s certificate using the CA’s public key. 
5. The POI verifies the SSAD with the issuer’s public key extracted from the 
issuer’s certificate. 
6. The POI verifies the ICC’s certificate with the issuer’s pubic key extracted 
from the issuer’s certificate. 
7. Finally, the POI verifies the SDAD with the ICC’s public key extracted 
from the ICC’s certificate. 
 
The dynamic data is comprised by data generated or stored in the ICC, and a 
dynamic number. This dynamic number is an ICC-generated time-variant 
parameter. 
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4.1.1.1.3. Combined Dynamic Data Authentication 
 
In addition to the DDA steps, the ICC uses a second dynamic signature, which 
contains the ICC decision of the current transaction that the POI must verify, 
thus preventing MITM attacks. 
 
Furthermore, CDA has a PIN encipherment option that uses an additional key-
pair associated exclusively with PIN encipherment. The POI uses the public key 
to encipher the PIN while the ICC uses the private key to verify the PIN [47]. 
 
4.1.1.2. Cardholder Verification Methods (CVMs) 
 
The EMV chip uses several CVMs [47], as seen in Figure 4.2 of section 4.1.1, 
to verify the identity of the cardholder: 
 
• Offline PIN Processing 
• Online PIN Processing 
• Signature Processing 
• Combination CVMs 
• Consumer Device Cardholder Verification Method (CD-CVM) 
 
4.1.1.2.1. Offline PIN Processing 
 
The offline PIN is used only if the online PIN processing is not working. The 
procedure is explained below and shown in Figure 4.5 [50]: 
 
1. The cardholder enters the PIN into the POI. 
2. The POI transmits the PIN to the ICC in plaintext or enciphered. 
3. The ICC compares the received PIN to its stored PIN. 
4. The ICC sends to the POI a yes or no answer depending on the 
comparison. 
5. The POI shows to the cardholder the results of the PIN validation. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Offline PIN procedure 
 
4.1.1.2.2. Online PIN Processing 
 
The online PIN procedure is explained below and shown in Figure 4.6 [51]: 
 
1. The cardholder enters the PIN into the POI. 
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2. The POI sends to the PSP the PIN along with the PAN and other 
sensitive data. 
3. The PSP relays the received information to the acquirer bank. 
4. The acquirer bank checks the IIN to transmit the received information to 
the corresponding issuer bank. 
5. The issuer receives the transmitted information and validates the PIN. 
6. The issuer sends back to the POI a “yes” or “no” response depending on 
the validation. This PIN validation results passes through the acquirer 
bank and the PSP. 
7. The POI shows to the cardholder the results of the PIN validation. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Online PIN procedure 
 
4.1.1.2.3. Signature Processing and Combination CVMs 
 
The POI performs the signature processing, which completes the cardholder 
verification process [47]. In the combination CVMs, multiple CVMs must be 
successfully completed. 
 
4.1.1.2.4. Consumer Device CVM 
 
This type of CVM is used for mobile payments, and its main focus is to verify 
the identity of the person presenting a consumer device (CD). For that, this 
method uses platform authenticators and relying applications [52]. 
 
• Platform Authenticators: Mechanisms provided by an underlying device 
that used by a consumer to unlock the device using, for example, 
passcodes, passwords, facial recognition, or fingerprints. 
• Relying Applications: Device applications that require information about 
the authentication of the consumer. 
 
There are three evaluation levels used in CD-CVM solutions [52]: 
 
• Device-level: Captures authentication data with platform authenticators 
and sends this data to the relying application. 
• Operating system level: Implements authentication mechanisms using 
application programming interfaces. 
• Application-level: Relies on the security functionalities provided by the 
device and mobile application. 
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4.1.2. EMV Three Domain Secure 2.0 (3DS 2.0) 
 
EMVCo designed, developed, and standardized 3DS (see section 1.4) for the 
CNP channel [53] to replace CVV2, which was deemed an unsecured 
authentication method (see section 2.7). 
 
4.1.2.1. Overview 
 
Version 2.0 of the EMV 3DS has been developed to address problems with 
EMV 3DS 1.0, which included its lack of support for applications other than web 
browsers, its complicated payment process, and its vulnerability to phishing and 
MITM attacks [54]. 
 
This specification includes three domains: the acquirer, the interoperability, and 
the issuer domains. The acquirer domain gathers the cardholders' information. 
Then the interoperability domain transfers information between the acquirer 
domain and the issuer domain. Finally, the issuer domain performs the 
verification and authentication of the cardholder. 
 
EMV 3DS 2.0 defines three cases for authentication initialization: 
 
• App-based: A CD uses a 3DS requestor application integrated with a 
3DS SDK to initiate a transaction. 
• Browser-based: A CD using a browser accesses a website for 
transaction initialization. 
• 3DS requestor: The 3DS requestor initializes the confirmation of account 
information and the authentication of the cardholder. 
 
4.1.2.2. Security Requirements 
 
The following requirements are in place to ensure payment security [55]. 
 
For links between the 3DS elements, the requirements are mutual 
authentication methods and transport layer security protocol communications. 
 
For app-based authentication channel security functions, the requirements are 
authentication of the 3DS requestor application, encryption of the 3DS SDK 
data and Diffie-Hellman, which is a method to securely exchange cryptographic 
keys over an unreliable channel [56]. 
 
4.1.2.3. Authentication Flows 
 
There are two types of authentication flows used by 3DS 2.0–the frictionless 
and the challenge, as seen in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 [55]. The different types of 
messages used by these two authentication flows are detailed within Annex A. 
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Fig. 4.7 Frictionless authentication flow 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 Challenge authentication flow 
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4.1.3. EMV Payment Tokenization 
 
The EMV payment tokenization specification is used in CP and CNP channels. 
This specification seeks to reduce risk and fraud. Its procedure can be seen in 
Figure 4.9 [57]. Each token generated is specific to the combination of a 
cardholder's PAN, the token requestor and the initially determined environment. 
Thus, a cardholder's PAN can have multiple tokens associated with it. To 
comply with regulatory requirements and to allow for a risk analysis, each token 
can be linked with a PAN using a payment account reference. 
 
 
Fig. 4.9 Tokenization procedure 
 
4.1.3.1. Identification and Verification (ID&V) Methods 
 
ID&V methods are used to authenticate the cardholder before issuing a 
payment token. 
 
To better understand the cardholder verification methods of the EMV payment 
tokenization specification, it is important to define the term authentication factor. 
An authentication factor is a procedure or piece of information used to 
authenticate the identity of a person. These authentications factors are 
something-you-know, something-you-are or something-you-have [58]. 
 
• Something-you-are: This authentication factor aims to authenticate the 
inherent traits of a person, which can be achieved by using, for example, 
biometrics, an iris pattern or a fingerprint. 
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• Something-you-know: This authentication factor aims to authenticate the 
information a person knows, which can be, for example, a password, or a 
user name. 
• Something-you-have: This authentication factor aims to authenticate a 
possession of a person, which can be, for example, a smart card or a 
security token. 
 
Tokenization uses various cardholder verification methods [57]. This 
specification also uses 3DS 2.0 (see section 4.1.2). 
 
• Risk-oriented non-interactive cardholder authentication: Performs a risk-
oriented assessment with data maintained and provided by a token 
requestor. 
• Card-issuer asserted authentication: The card issuer assures that an 
issuer's approved authentication method is sufficient 
• Card-issuer account verification: The issuer performs account 
verification. 
• One-factor authentication: This uses only a something-you-know or 
something-you-have authentication factor. 
• Two-factor authentication: Uses two out of the three authentication types, 
which are something-you-know, something-you-are, or something-you-
have. 
 
4.1.3.2. Use Cases 
 
Google Pay service and Apple Pay service are using tokenization to transact 
payments more securely. 
 
In the case of Google Pay, the cardholder's CD has a token assigned to it and 
stores an encryption key. This encryption key decrypts limited-use keys (LUKs) 
and single-use keys (SUKs) [59]. Finally, the TSP uses the LUKs and SUKs to 
link the token with the cardholder's PAN and to validate the token [60]. 
 
Along with tokenization, for Google Pay also uses host card emulation (HCE). 
HCE is a technology used to emulate a payment card that can communicate 
with a POI via an NFC chip. Since the host device is not secure, HCE uses 
different payment data for each transaction and transaction cryptograms [61]. 
 
For Apple Pay, the cardholder's CD has a token assigned to it, and its CD 
secure element stores this token near the NFC chip [62]. Then the token, token 
key, transaction amount, and other required information are used to generate a 
dynamic cryptogram after each transaction. Finally, the TSP uses the token to 
validate the token inside the dynamic cryptogram [63]. 
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4.2. PCI Standards 
 
As mentioned in section 1.3, PCI’s standards provide requirements for securing 
data in the card payment transaction process. Figure 4.10 shows the PCI SSC 
standards this document addresses and their scope. 
 
 
Fig. 4.10 PCI standards’ scope 
 
4.2.1. PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 
 
PCI DSS defines requirements for all entities processing, transmitting, or storing 
cardholder data, including merchants. These requirements were designed to 
protect account data and to facilitate global adoption of data security measures 
[64]. 
 
4.2.1.1. Overview 
 
For merchants, the payment brands have defined four compliance levels (see 
Table 4.1). These levels depend on the number of transactions per year that a 
business processes with payment cards. These compliance levels specify the 
validation methods an enterprise needs to meet to remain compliant [65]. 
 
• Level 1 entities: Undergo a yearly internal audit by an accredited PCI 
auditor. Additionally, once a quarter, they must have an external network 
vulnerability scan (ENVS) performed by an approved scanning vendor 
(ASV). 
• Level 2, level 3, and level 4 entities: Yearly completion of a relevant SAQ. 
Additionally, a business may be required to have an ENVS performed by 
an ASV. 
 
Table 4.1 PCI DSS enterprise compliance levels 
PCI DSS Compliance Levels 
Level 1 More than 6M transactions per year 
Level 2 Between 1M and 6M transactions per year 
Level 3 Between 20K and 1M transactions per year 
Level 4 Fewer than 20K transactions per year 
26 Analysis and Evaluation of Security Developments in Electronic Payment Methods 
PCI DSS divides account data into cardholder data and sensitive authentication 
data [64] (see Table 4.2). Cardholder data can be stored in devices, except for 
the PAN, which needs to be stored as unreadable, while sensitive account data 
cannot be stored in devices. 
 
Table 4.2 PCI DSS account data categorization 
  Data Element Storage Permitted 
Account 
Data 
Cardholder 
Data 
PAN Yes (unreadable) 
Cardholder Name Yes 
Service Code Yes 
Expiration Date Yes 
Sensitive 
Authentication 
Data 
Full Track Data No 
CVV2 No 
PIN No 
 
This standard specifies that if the PAN is to be displayed, then it needs to be 
masked unless a merchant has a specific need to show the full PAN. Masking 
refers to hiding a portion of the PAN’s digits when it is displayed or printed. As 
mentioned in section 2.3, PCI DSS defines the first six and last four digits as the 
maximum PAN digits that need not to be masked [66]. 
 
In the case of PAN storage, the standard specifies that the merchant should 
perform one of the following procedures [64]: 
 
• One-way hashing: Uses a one-way mathematical function that uses the 
PAN as input and produces a fixed-length output called a message 
digest. This message digest is non-reversible. 
• Truncation: Removes a portion of the PAN permanently. 
• Index tokenization: Replacement of the PAN with an unpredictable value 
using an index as an input. 
• Encryption: Transforms the PAN into an unintelligible form that requires a 
specific key to be reverted to the PAN again. This method requires the 
association of key-management processes and procedures. 
 
4.2.1.2. Main Goals 
 
In general, PCI DSS defines six goals that are achieved by the fulfillment of the 
standard’s requirements. 
 
1. Build and maintain a secure network and systems 
2. Protect cardholder data 
3. Maintain a vulnerability management program 
4. Implement strong access control measures 
5. Regularly monitor and test networks 
6. Maintain an information security policy 
 
To learn more about the rationales behind these goals, refer to Annex B. 
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4.2.1.3. Self-Assessment Questionnaires (SAQ) 
 
SAQs are self-evaluation tools merchants use to confirm they are compliant 
with PCI DSS. PCI SSC defines multiple SAQs [67], which are listed in Table 
4.3. For more information, refer to Annex C. Refer to section 5.1.2 and section 
5.2.2 for an evaluation of SAQs for CP and CNP channels. 
 
Table 4.3 Types of SAQs per payment channel 
SAQs for PCI DSS compliance 
CP CNP 
P2PE 
A 
A-EP (e-commerce) 
D D (e-commerce) 
B B (MOTO) 
B-IP B-IP (MOTO) 
C-VT C-VT (MOTO) 
C C (MOTO) 
 
4.2.2. PCI Point-to-Point Encryption (PCI P2PE) 
 
PCI P2PE is a set of security requirements for encryption solution providers to 
validate their work and ensure the protection of sensitive authentication data 
and the cardholder’s data by encrypting them before transmission [69] in the CP 
channel. 
 
4.2.2.1. Environment and Decryption Types 
 
PCI P2PE defines different environments [70]: the encryption environment, the 
decryption environment, key-injection facilities, and the cardholder data 
environment. These environments are defined as follows. 
 
• Encryption environment: This environment is located on the merchant’s 
side and contains PCI-approved POI devices used for the acceptance 
and encryption of account data. 
• Decryption environment: This environment is at the P2PE solutions 
provider. It contains the HSM used to decrypt the encrypted account data 
sent by the encryption environment. 
• Key-injection facilities: This environment is located either at the 
component provider or at the P2PE solutions provider. These key-
injection facilities inject keys both at the PCI-approved POI devices to 
perform encryption and at the P2PE solutions provider’s HSM to perform 
decryption. 
• Cardholder data environment: This environment includes the people, 
processes, and technologies, that handle cardholder data and sensitive 
data authentication. 
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Furthermore, PCI P2PE performs two types of decryption: hardware decryption 
and hybrid decryption [69]. 
 
• Hardware decryption: The HSMs perform the decryption of account data. 
• Hybrid decryption: The decryption of account data is performed by the 
HSM and by a non-secure cryptographic device (nSCD) host system. 
 
4.2.2.2. Domain Types 
 
PCI P2PE applies to several domains, as shown in Table 4.4. These domains 
constitute regions where security needs to be applied and validated [69]. 
 
Table 4.4 PCI P2PE domains and responsibilities 
PCI P2PE Domains 
Domain Name Summary 
Encryption Device and Application 
Management 
Covers the usage of secure PCI-approved 
POI devices, P2PE applications, and 
P2PE non-payment software. This 
domain’s requirements include the review, 
installation, and configuration of P2PE 
applications and P2PE non-payment 
software. 
Application Security 
This domain includes the secure payment 
applications with access to clear-text 
account data that are installed only on 
PCI-approved POI devices. 
P2PE Solution Management 
This domains includes providers of the 
various devices, products, and 
environments that consist of a P2PE 
solution, and the provisioning of a P2PE 
instruction manual. 
Merchant–Managed Solutions 
The merchants manage the P2PE solution, 
in which the encryption and decryption 
environment duties and functions are 
separated. 
Decryption Environment 
This environment covers the secure 
management of HSMs and nSCD host 
systems involved in the decryption of 
encrypted account data. 
P2PE Cryptographic Key Operations 
and Device Management 
Responsible for the requirements for 
strong-cryptographic keys and secure-
management functions for all PCI-
approved POI devices, HSMs, and nSCD 
host systems. 
 
 
Involved Standards  29 
4.2.2.3. Procedure 
 
Figure 4.11 summarizes the procedure that PCI P2PE follows. It is important to 
note that whether the merchant is perfoming the P2PE internally or having a 
third-party provider perform the service the procedure remains the same [69]. 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 PCI P2PE procedure 
 
4.2.3. PCI Payment Application Data Security Standard (PCI PA-DSS) 
 
PCI PA-DSS is a set of security requirements intended for off-the-shelf 
applications. This standard is imposed on payment application software vendors 
to minimize sensitive data leaks from the payment application during the 
transaction process [71]. Although this standard originated from PCI DSS, the 
fact that an entity uses a PCI PA-DSS application does not imply full PCI DSS 
compliance. 
 
PCI PA-DSS states six main goals to protect cardholder data used in the 
payment application. Some of these goals are shared with PCI DSS [71]. 
 
• Manufacture and maintain a secure payment application 
• Implement strong access control and monitoring 
• Provide easy and secure integration and remote access 
• Protect cardholder data 
• Secure network connectivity before transmission of data 
• Ensure easy implementation, governance and maintenance of PA-DSS 
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4.2.4. PCI PIN Transaction Security (PCI PTS) 
 
PCI PTS covers the PCI PTS HSM and the PCI PTS POI. These standards are 
a set of security requirements, guidelines and testing procedures manufacturers 
and vendors must meet to satisfy the needs of the financial payment industry by 
assuring the security of the HSMs and POIs from manufacturing to the initial 
deployment location. The aligned goals of these standards are these: 
 
• To ensure the security of devices at a physical and logical level to protect 
and guarantee the safety of sensitive data and cryptographic keys. 
• To ensure the secure manufacturing and deployment of devices. 
 
Each of these standards targets different objectives. For example, PCI PTS 
HSM targets the secure handling of cryptographic keys to securely perform 
remote administration. PCI PTS POI targets the integration of the POI into the 
POS terminal, the configuration and maintenance of the device and the 
requirements needed to secure reading and exchange of data. 
 
When a merchant is pursuing the fulfillment of PCI DSS compliance, one of the 
requirements is that the POIs used by the merchant must be PCI PTS POI 
compliant. In contrast, the HSMs may be validated with either the PCI PTS 
HSM or the federal information processing standard 140-2. See [72] and [73] for 
more information. 
 
4.2.5. PCI Three Domain Secure (PCI 3DS) 
 
PCI 3DS 1.0 defines the requirements, controls, and security measures needed 
to protect 3DS environments. This standard acts as a security guideline, and 
the decision to require it is made by the card payment brands. 
 
As seen in section 1.4, PCI SSC collaborated on the publication of the PCI 3DS 
Core Security and PCI 3DS SDK Security Standards. These standards address 
the different components that are involved in the EMV 3DS 2.0 specification, as 
seen in section 4.1.2. 
 
The PCI 3DS Core Security Standard addresses all the security requirements, 
methods and processes that an entity needs to ensure protection and security 
of the 3DS server, 3DS Directory Server (DS) and 3DS Access Control Server 
(ACS). 
 
The PCI 3DS SDK Security Standard covers specific 3DS data elements that 
play a role in the 3DS 2.0 transaction process and specifies the type of 
protection that each of these elements requires, which can be to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity or both. For more information, refer to [74] and [75]. 
 
 
Evaluation  31 
CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION 
 
This chapter presents the concepts used for the creation of the evaluation 
metrics, the reasoning behind the metric value assignments, and the evaluation 
results, which are used to provide recommendations for each payment channel. 
 
Building on the presentation of various technologies and standards in previous 
chapters, this chapter evaluates two main topics. The first topic is about those 
technologies with the greatest impact on the security of payment transactions 
today. The second topic is about the amount of effort required of merchants to 
comply with PCI DSS. For these two topics, each payment channel (see 
chapter 3) has its corresponding assigned technologies and SAQs. 
 
The metrics presented in this chapter have been created by the author based 
on the characteristics of each technology and standard compliance tool. The 
goal is to assign quantifiable values to each of these characteristics and to use 
these values for evaluation purposes. 
 
5.1. Card-Present Scenario 
 
In the CP channel (see section 3.2) there are two technologies involved in the 
payment transaction process in today’s payment card structure: the MS ( see 
section 2.5) and the EMV chip (see section 2.2 and section 4.1.1). This section 
also focuses on the SAQ B-IP and the SAQ P2PE (see section 4.2.1.3), each 
with different requirements that merchants need to meet to comply with PCI 
DSS. 
 
5.1.1. Technology 
 
This section's objective is to evaluate the overall security of the EMV chip and 
MS technologies. First, it is important to define metrics to indicate quantifiable 
value for evaluation purposes. With that in mind, five metrics have been 
selected: confidentiality, integrity, authentication, data type, and attack 
resistance. 
 
• Confidentiality: This is the assurance that data is accessed only by 
authorized entities. 
• Integrity: This is the assurance that data has not been altered in 
transmission, from its creation to its delivery, and the assurance that only 
authorized entities can modify that data. 
• Authentication: This is the assurance that a claimed characteristic of an 
individual is correct (see section 1.1). 
• Data type: This defines the character of the data used by a technology, 
which can be static or dynamic. 
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• Attack resistance: This defines the ability of the technology to withstand 
attacks from criminals. 
 
For the metric “confidentiality,” the assessment is done with one of two values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric. 
 
The metric “integrity” is assessed on a scale of three values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric with the attribute “weak.” 
• Value +1: If the technology possesses the metric with the attribute 
“strong.” 
 
The metric “authentication” is assessed with two values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric. 
 
The metric “data type” is assessed with two values. 
 
• Value 0: If the technology uses static data. 
• Value +1: If the technology uses dynamic data. 
 
The metric “attack resistance” is assessed on a scale of three values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric with the attribute “low.” 
• Value +1: If the technology possesses the metric with the attribute “high.” 
 
Below is the evaluation of these technologies against each of these five metrics. 
 
For the EMV chip: 
 
• Confidentiality is achieved due to the encrypted data stored inside the 
ICC, which can only be decrypted by the POI using the appropriate 
decryption-key. 
• Strong integrity is achieved by the issuer, with MACs to assure the 
validity and authenticity of the message, as discussed in section 4.1.1. 
• Authentication is achieved due to the various authentication methods, as 
discussed in section 4.1.1.1. 
• The data type is dynamic, as the chip uses dynamic data for 
authentication and transaction procedures. 
• High attack resistance is intrinsic to the EMV chip due to the many 
authentication, verification, and security mechanisms that this technology 
possesses. These make it extremely hard to attack by, for example, 
cloning. 
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For the MS: 
 
• Absence of confidentiality is due to the use of plain text data stored within 
the tracks of the MS. 
• Integrity is weak because the LRC only checks transmission errors. 
• Authentication is absent due to the lack of authentication mechanisms. 
• The data type is static as a result of the limitations of the technology. 
• The MS has low attack resistance given its lack of confidentiality and 
authentication mechanisms, along with weak integrity and the type of 
data it uses. Given its technical limitations, the MS is easily attacked by, 
for example, cloning. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the assigned metric values for the technologies evaluated 
above. 
 
Table 5.1 CP technology evaluation scores 
Technology 
EMV Chip Value MS Value 
Confidentiality 0 No confidentiality -1 
Strong integrity +1 Weak integrity 0 
Authentication 0 No authentication -1 
Data type is dynamic +1 Data type is static 0 
High attack resistance +1 Low attack resistance 0 
Overall Score +3 Overall Score -2 
 
5.1.2. PCI DSS Compliance 
 
The objective of this section is to evaluate the level of overall effort required of 
merchants for compliance with PCI DSS using either SAQ P2PE or SAQ B-IP. 
Three metrics have been selected: number of applicable PCI DSS 
requirements, number of questions to be assessed, and applicable scope of 
systems. 
 
• Number of applicable PCI DSS requirements: This metric provides the 
number of requirements a merchant must meet to be in compliance when 
using a specific SAQ. 
• Number of questions to be assessed: This metric provides, for a specific, 
SAQ the number of questions that a merchant needs to assess. 
• Applicable scope of systems: This metric provides a clear and defined 
scope for what an SAQ evaluates. 
 
For the metric “number of applicable PCI DSS requirements,” since PCI DSS 
includes 12 requirements, four possible values have been defined. 
 
• Value 1: If the number of requirements is less than or equal to 3. 
• Value 2: If the number of requirements is 4–6. 
• Value 3: If the number of requirements is 7–9. 
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• Value 4: If the number of requirements is 10–12. 
 
The metric “number of questions to be assessed” is assessed on a scale of four 
values, since the maximum number of questions an SAQ can have is unknown. 
 
• Value 1: If the number of questions assessed is less than or equal to 50. 
• Value 2: If the number of questions assessed is 51–100. 
• Value 3: If the number of questions assessed is 101–150. 
• Value 4: If the number of questions assessed is greater than 150. 
 
The metric “applicable scope of systems” is assessed with one of two values. 
 
• Value 1: If the SAQ clearly specifies which network devices the merchant 
must configure for PCI DSS compliance and if the number of network 
devices a merchant needs to configure is low. 
• Value 2: If the SAQ does not specify which network devices the merchant 
must configure for PCI DSS compliance and if the number of network 
devices a merchants needs to configure is high. 
 
Table 5.2 lists the assigned metric values for the two evaluated SAQs. 
 
Table 5.2 CP SAQ evaluation scores 
SAQ Metrics 
SAQ P2PE Value SAQ B-IP Value 
3 applicable PCI DSS 
requirements 
1 
10 applicable PCI DSS 
requirements 
4 
33 questions to be 
assessed 
1 82 questions to be assessed 2 
Reduced and clear scope of 
systems 
1 
Extensive and unclear scope of 
systems 
2 
Overall Score 3 Overall Score 8 
 
5.1.3. Results 
 
Based on the results from section 5.1.1 and section 5.1.2, the final results for 
security and effort in CP scenarios can be seen in Figure 5.1. These results 
suggest the preferred scenario for a CP channel for electronic payments is to 
use the EMV chip and SAQ P2PE for their high level of security and low level of 
required effort. 
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Fig. 5.1 CP scenario results 
 
Having this in mind, the following recommendations are presented. 
 
• Manufacturers of terminals should stop supporting MS technology. 
• Manufacturers of payment cards should stop embedding MS into the 
payment cards. 
• Merchants should stop supporting MS payments. 
• Merchants should aim to meet the eligibility criteria of SAQ P2PE to 
reduce the amount of effort needed for PCI DSS compliance. 
 
5.2. Card-Not-Present Scenario 
 
In the CNP channel (see section 3.3) there are two main technologies involved 
in the payment process, CVV2, which is present in today’s payment card 
structure (see section 2.7), and 3DS 2.0 (see section 1.4, section 4.1.2 and 
section 4.2.5), which is a state-of-the-art technology. This section also focuses 
on the SAQ A and the SAQ A-EP (see section 4.2.1.3), each with different 
requirements that merchants need to meet to comply with PCI DSS. 
 
5.2.1. Technology 
 
The objective of this section is to evaluate the overall security of the 3DS 2.0 
and CVV2 technologies. First, it is important to define quantifiable metrics for 
this evaluation. Four metrics have been selected: non-repudiated purchase, 
authentication, validity and technology characteristic. 
 
• Non-repudiated purchase: This is ability to guarantee that a purchase 
has been made by a cardholder. 
• Authentication: This is the provision of assurance that a claimed 
characteristic of an individual is correct (see section 1.1). 
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• Validity: This states the length of time for which a given set of parameters 
is valid for the technology. Two cases are present in this metric. 
o Validity per transaction: The technology with a given set of 
parameters is valid for a given transaction. New parameters are 
presented for each new transaction. 
o Validity during card lifetime: The technology with a given set of 
parameters is valid during the lifetime of the payment card. Once 
the payment card expires, the technology parameters are 
changed. 
• Technology characteristic: This identifies the essential nature of the 
technology. Two cases are presented in this metric. 
o Dynamic: This term identifies the technology as a procedure used 
to reach a defined goal. 
o Static: This term identifies the technology as a static value used to 
reach a defined goal. 
 
For the metric “non-repudiated purchase,” the assessment is done with one of 
two values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric. 
 
The metric “authentication” is assessed with two values. 
 
• Value -1: If the technology lacks the metric. 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses the metric. 
 
The metric “validity” is assessed with two values. 
 
• Value 0: If the attribute of the metric is “during card lifetime.” 
• Value +1: If the attribute of the metric is “per transaction.” 
 
The metric “technology characteristic” is assessed with two values. 
 
• Value 0: If the technology possesses a static nature. 
• Value +1: If the technology possesses a dynamic nature. 
 
Below is the evaluation of these technologies against each of the above 
metrics. 
 
For 3DS 2.0: 
 
• Non-repudiated purchase is present, as the cardholder must authenticate 
itself before making a purchase of a good or service from a merchant. 
• Authentication is present, as this technology can perform authentication 
in either a frictionless or a challenged flow. 
• Validity is per transaction because the parameters that the technology 
uses to authenticate a cardholder vary with each transaction. 
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• The characteristic of the technology is dynamic in nature, as the 
technology is a procedure used to authenticate a cardholder. 
 
For CVV2: 
 
• Non-repudiated purchase is absent because the cardholder does not 
authenticate itself before making a purchase of a good or service from a 
merchant. 
• Authentication is absent because the technology verifies only the 
possession of the payment card or that the consumer knows the CVV2 
value but does not authenticate the cardholder. 
• Validity extends for the card lifetime because the issuer bank uses 
certain parameters to obtain a CVV2 value, which is printed on the 
payment card and is changed only when a new payment card is issued. 
• The characteristic of the technology is static in nature, as the technology 
is a static value used to verify the possession of the payment card. 
 
The values assigned to these technologies for each metric are listed in Table 
5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 CNP technology evaluation scores 
Technology 
3DS 2.0 Value CVV2 Value 
Non-repudiated purchase 0 No non-repudiated purchase -1 
Authentication 0 No authentication -1 
Validity per transaction +1 Validity during card lifetime 0 
Dynamic nature +1 Static nature 0 
Overall Score +2 Overall Score -2 
 
5.2.2. PCI DSS Compliance 
 
The objective of this section is to evaluate the level of overall effort required of 
merchants for compliance with PCI DSS by using SAQ A or SAQ A-EP. Three 
metrics have been selected: number of applicable PCI DSS requirements, 
number of questions to be assessed and applicable scope of systems. 
 
• Number of applicable PCI DSS requirements: This metric provides the 
number of requirements a merchant must meet to be in compliance when 
using a specific SAQ. 
• Number of questions to be assessed: This metric provides for a specific 
SAQ, the number of questions that a merchant needs to assess. 
• Applicable scope of systems: This metric provides a clear and defined 
scope for what an SAQ evaluates. 
 
For the metric “number of applicable PCI DSS requirements,” since PCI DSS 
includes 12 requirements, four possible values have been defined. 
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• Value 1: If the number of requirements is less than or equal to 3. 
• Value 2: If the number of requirements is 4–6. 
• Value 3: If the number of requirements is 7–9. 
• Value 4: If the number of requirements is 10–12. 
 
The metric “number of questions to be assessed,” is assessed on a scale of 
four values since the maximum number of questions an SAQ can have is 
unknown. 
 
• Value 1: If the number of questions assessed is less than or equal to 50. 
• Value 2: If the number of questions assessed is 51–100. 
• Value 3: If the number of questions assessed is 101–150. 
• Value 4: If the number of questions assessed is greater than 150. 
 
The metric “applicable scope of systems” is assessed with one of two values. 
 
• Value 1: If the SAQ clearly specifies which network devices the merchant 
must configure for PCI DSS compliance and if the number of network 
devices needed to configure is low. 
• Value 2: If the SAQ does not specify which network devices the merchant 
must configure for PCI DSS compliance and if the number of network 
devices needed to configure is high. 
 
The assigned metric values for the evaluated SAQs are given in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 CNP SAQ evaluation scores 
SAQ Metrics 
SAQ A Value SAQ A-EP Value 
5 applicable PCI DSS 
requirements 
2 
12 applicable PCI DSS 
requirements 
4 
22 questions to be 
assessed 
1 191 questions to be assessed 4 
Reduced and clear scope of 
systems 
1 
Extensive and unclear scope of 
systems 
2 
Overall Score 4 Overall Score 10 
 
5.2.3. Results 
 
From the results in section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2, the final results for security 
and effort in CNP scenarios are assembled in Figure 5.2. Based on these 
results, the preferred scenario for a CNP channel for electronic payments is to 
use 3DS 2.0 and SAQ A for their high level of security and low level of required 
effort. 
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Fig. 5.2 CNP scenario results 
 
With the results obtained previously, it is possible to provide the following 
recommendations: 
 
• Merchants should aim to meet the eligibility criteria of SAQ A to reduce 
the amount of effort PCI DSS compliance requires. 
• Merchants should start adopting 3DS 2.0 as an authentication protocol 
instead of using CVV2. 
• Manufacturers of payment cards should stop printing CVV2 into the 
payment cards. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis presents a compilation of information on payment card technologies 
and standards that was gathered and matched from various official documents. 
With this, it is possible to understand from a single source the security 
mechanisms the technologies and standards provide. This thesis also, defined 
and applied a number of metrics to evaluate and compare the technologies and 
standards compliance tools reviewed. 
 
Organizations such as ISO, EMVCo, and PCI SSC play a critical role in the 
security of card payment transactions. ISO has an indirect role in the process; 
this organization defines many concepts used in information security and other 
areas that serve as a base for various technologies and standards. EMVCo 
plays a direct role in the security of card payments. This organization defines 
the technologies used by the parties involved during a card payment and is in 
charge of continually maintaining, developing, and updating technologies to 
secure card payments. PCI SSC also plays a direct role, defining various 
standards that involved parties need to comply with to assure card payment 
security. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this thesis, an active collaboration 
between EMVCo and PCI SSC resulted in the development of the 3DS 2.0 
protocol. 
 
The analysis of the structured elements of the payment card revealed ten 
elements. Each of these elements, except for two, implements a security 
feature for the payment card. The first exception is the magnetic stripe, which is 
an outdated and unsecured technology for the card-present channel that is still 
in place to make the payment card backwards compatible with out-of-date POIs. 
The second exception is the CVV2, which is a security mechanism for the card-
not-present channel that only authenticates the possession of the payment 
card. 
 
Studying the card payment life cycle revealed at least five entities with a role in 
the payment process. The two payment channels available for the card 
payment process are the card-present channel and the card-not-present 
channel. These channels indicate the presence or absence of the cardholder at 
the merchant's facilities when a card payment is initiated. 
 
Three EMVCo technologies are reviewed in this document: the EMV chip, EMV 
3DS 2.0, and the EMV payment tokenization. Each of these technologies 
implements several security features, including data authentication, cardholder 
verification methods, authentication flows, and verification and identification 
methods. These security features are essential because the presence, 
absence, or combination of them affects the overall security of the technology. 
The study addressed four standards from the PCI SSC: the PCI DSS, the PCI 
PTS, the PCI PA-DSS and the PCI P2PE. These standards have protecting the 
cardholder's sensitive data as their primary objective. For the PCI DSS 
specifically, there are eight self-assessment questionnaires that each merchant 
can use, depending on its eligibility criteria. 
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Having evaluated the SAQs and technologies for the CP scenario, this thesis 
recommends the EMV chip as providing better security features and use of 
SAQ P2PE, which reduces the effort merchants must invest for PCI DSS 
compliance. In the CNP scenario, the evaluation results indicate a clear 
recommendation for the better security of the channel the use of the 3DS 2.0 
technology and for the SAQ A as requiring less effort from merchants for PCI 
DSS compliance. 
 
During the evaluation presented in this research, it was possible to answer the 
two previously mentioned questions. For the first question, To what extent do 
these involved technologies provide security for the data used in card payment 
transactions for the different payment channels? For the CP channel, it was 
found that the MS technology does not provide security due to the 
characteristics this technology possesses. In contrast, the EMV chip technology 
with its intrinsic characteristics provides security to the CP channel. For the 
CNP channel, it was found that CVV2 does not provide security due to its 
characteristics. In contrast, 3DS 2.0 with its intrinsic characteristics provides 
security to the CNP channel. And for the second question, How much effort is 
required of merchants using SAQs to ensure the compliance with PCI DSS? It 
was found that for the CP channel, using the SAQ B-IP requires more effort 
than using the SAQ P2PE. As for the CNP channel, it was found that using the 
SAQ A-EP requires more effort than using the SAQ A. 
 
After evaluating both payment channels, it was possible to present further 
recommendations. For the CP channel, manufacturers of terminals should stop 
supporting MS technology, manufacturers of payment cards should stop 
embedding the MS into cards, and merchants should stop supporting MS 
payments. For the CNP channel, card manufacturers should stop printing the 
CVV2 into cards, and merchants should move to 3DS 2.0 as an authentication 
protocol instead of using CVV2. 
 
The greater security of the technologies recommended above will considerably 
reduce the amount of fraud that both payment channels suffer. This reduction of 
fraud implies a reduction of the incurred losses for the different involved entities 
in payment card transactions. Additionally, using the above recommended 
SAQs for PCI DSS compliance result in less required effort from merchants, 
which can lead to a reduction of involved costs and time spent. 
 
There is an ethical obligation to protect the sensitive data within the payment 
card used during the payment transaction. This ethical obligation resides to 
prevent the financial and emotional consequences that victims of fraud suffer. 
With this in consideration, it is important to use the previous technologies 
recommended. These said technologies, are up-to-date and state-of-the-art 
technologies that strengthen the security of payment card transactions today. 
 
It is important to mention some limitations that the present thesis presents. First, 
in evaluating technology in the CP channel, it was assumed that there is no 
mechanism to detect cloned payment cards MSs. In reality, such methods do 
exist but are not implemented, and it would be interesting in future research to 
include this in the evaluation process to learn how it affects the score of the 
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“attack resistance” metric. Second, in evaluating the effort required to 
completed SAQs, the costs implicit in using each SAQ were not considered. 
These might include costs per transaction, cost per service and cost of POIs. 
Considering these costs in future research would procude a more precise 
estimate of the effort merchants must invest in PCI DSS compliance. 
 
For future steps, it is essential to continue with a detailed study of new security 
mechanisms being implemented for innovative and alternative methods of 
electronic payments. Also, continuing research and innovation in authentication 
mechanisms will improve the security of card payments for both payment 
channels while maintaining practicability and acceptance by the consumer. 
Finally, it should be noted that the constant evolution of criminal attacks on 
electronic payments for illegal gains must be followed and counteracted by the 
development of further security technologies and measures. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex A: EMV 3DS 2.0 messages types 
 
The 3DS authentication protocol uses many messages to carry out the process 
of authenticating an individual. These messages have different functions, and 
they are listed as follows. 
 
3DS Messages Types 
Name Description 
Authentication Request 
Message 
(AReq) 
The first message of the 3DS authentication 
protocol, this message contains the cardholder, 
payment and device information. The formation 
of this message occurs after the 3DS server 
has requested cardholder authentication. Also, 
there is only one AReq message per 
transaction. 
Authentication Response 
Message 
(ARes) 
This message acknowledges the receipt of the 
AReq message from part of the ACS to the 
3DS server. It returns the results of the 
authentication request. There can be only one 
ARes message per transaction. 
Challenge Request Message 
(CReq) 
This message initiates the interaction of the 
cardholder in the challenge flow. It carries the 
cardholder's authentication data. For app-
based channels, there can be multiple CReq 
messages per challenge, while in browser-
based channels, there can be only one CReq 
message per challenge. 
Challenge Response 
Message 
(CRes) 
This is the response of the ACS to the CReq 
message. For browser-based channels, it 
transmits the cardholder's authentication 
outcome. For app-based channels, it can 
indicate the results or further requirements to 
complete authentication. 
Results Request Message 
(RReq) 
This message is sent by the 3DS server to the 
ACS and includes the authentication or 
verification results. There can be only one 
RReq message per transaction. 
Results Response Message 
(RRes) 
This message is sent by the ACS to the 3DS 
server acknowledging receipt of the RReq 
message. There can be only one RRes 
message per transaction. 
Error Message 
This message contains information about 
errors that occurred in message processing 
among the 3DS server, the DS, the ACS, and 
the 3DS SDK. 
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Annex B: PCI DSS goals and requirements 
 
An explanation for each of the requirements in the PCI DSS is given below. 
 
PCI Data Security Standard 
Goals Requirements Reason 
Build and 
maintain 
secure 
networks and 
systems 
Install and maintain a firewall 
configuration to protect 
cardholder data. 
To perform network monitoring 
and to block transmissions that 
are outside security criteria. 
Do not use defaults provided 
by vendors for system 
passwords and other security 
parameters. 
Default passwords and settings 
are easily determined. 
Protect 
cardholder 
data 
Protect stored cardholder 
data. 
Methods such as encryption, 
truncation, masking, and 
hashing protect critical account 
data from malicious users. 
Encrypt transmission of 
cardholder data across open, 
public networks. 
Malicious users can exploit the 
vulnerabilities of wireless 
networks. 
Maintain a 
vulnerability 
management 
program 
Protect all systems from 
malware and frequently 
update anti-virus software or 
programs. 
Anti-virus software protects 
systems from malicious 
software aiming to exploit 
vulnerabilities and needs to be 
updated regularly. 
Develop and maintain secure 
systems and applications. 
The main goal is to regularly 
patch systems to prevent 
exploitation and compromise. 
Implement 
strong 
access 
control 
measures 
Restrict access to cardholder 
information by the need to 
know from the business. 
Ensure the access of only 
authorized personnel to critical 
data. 
Identify and authenticate 
access to system 
components. 
To provide accountability and 
tracing of actions performed on 
critical data and systems. 
Restrict physical access to 
cardholder data. 
Keep unauthorized individuals 
from accessing or removing 
data. 
Regularly 
monitor and 
test networks 
Track and monitor all access 
to network resources and 
cardholder data. 
To prevent, to detect or to 
minimize the impact of a data 
compromise. 
Regularly test security 
systems and processes. 
The main goal is to look for and 
patch new vulnerabilities. 
Maintain an 
information 
security 
policy 
Maintain for all personnel an 
information security policy. 
To protect data by assigning 
specific responsibilities to 
specific personnel. 
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Annex C: Types of SAQs 
 
This annex shows the different SAQs that a merchant can use, if they meet the 
eligibility criteria, to comply with PCI DSS. 
 
Types of SAQs 
SAQ Channel Questions Description 
A CNP 22 
Directed to merchants that have all 
cardholder data processing outsourced to 
a PCI-compliant third-party service 
provider. Additionally, the merchant’s 
systems or premises must not transmit or 
electronically store cardholder data. 
A-EP 
CNP  
(e-commerce) 
191 
For merchants that have outsourced 
cardholder data processing to a PCI-
compliant third-party service provider and 
have a website(s) that could impact the 
security of the payment transaction. The 
merchant’s systems or premises must not 
transmit or electronically store cardholder 
data. 
B 
CP and CNP 
(MOTO) 
41 
This SAQ is for merchants that use imprint 
machines or standalone dial-out terminals 
that do not electronically store cardholder 
data. 
B-IP 82 
An SAQ for merchants that use only 
standalone PTS-approved payment 
terminals that do not electronically store 
cardholder data. 
C-VT 79 
This SAQ is for merchants that, via a 
keyboard, enter a single transaction into an 
internet-based virtual payment terminal 
solution provided by a PCI-DSS validated 
third-party service provider. There is no 
electronic storage of cardholder data. 
C 160 
This SAQ is for merchants, that do not 
store cardholder data and that use 
payment application systems connected to 
the Internet. 
P2PE CP 33 
Directed to merchants that use only 
hardware payment terminals included and 
managed by a validated PCI P2PE 
solution. There is no electronic storage of 
cardholder data. 
D 
CP and CNP 
(e-commerce) 
329 
For merchants not included in any of the 
SAQs previously mention. 
 
